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HARARE: FROM A EUROPEAN SETTLER-COLONIAL ‘SUNSHINE CITY’ TO A 
‘ZHINGZHONG’ AFRICAN CITY 
 
 
Abstract: Fifteen years after Zimbabwe’s political independence and Black majority 
rule, Rakodi (1995) concluded that Harare, the capital city, remained quintessentially a 
settler colonial city.  Then, Harare had not yet experienced the full impacts of ‘neo-
liberalism’ as in Nairobi or the suburbanization of office and commercial development as 
in Johannesburg.  In view of significant political economy transformations since the 
1990s, this paper aims to provide a systematic interpretation of ongoing transitions that 
characterise the city.  Informed by a systemic spatio-temporal and historical analysis it 
illustrates how ongoing post 1990s foundational restructuring of the economy centred on 
jambanja have transformed Harare from a settler colonial to a highly informalised 
‘zhingzhong’ African city.   
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Introduction:  settler-colonial past and unsettled present 
In a pivotal publication, Rakodi (1995) concluded that notwithstanding the real and growing 
problems of administration, land, housing and service delivery (Zinyama et al. 1993), Harare 
continued as a settler colonial city with structural changes neither to its economy nor institutions.  
It appeared that Harare “... could be in Europe and yet in many ways European influences, 
distorted through a settler prism had formed the city...” (Rakodi, 1995: 274).  Urban Zimbabwe’s 
exceptionality included the relative absence of slum and squatter settlements (Potts, 2006; UN-
HABITAT, 2010: 248). Harare was well planned, pleasant, and orderly with colonial privileges 
still intact. And unlike elsewhere in Africa, there was strict control over illegal developments 
and informality while infrastructure and services were maintained and wage employment 
remained dominant. How and to what extent the city has changed is the focus of this paper. 
 
In a cross-continent comparative review of urban theorisation, Roy (2011) notes that although 
‘peasants in cities’ and informalisation under conditions of neoliberal globalisation dominate 
African urban scholarship, there is also a particular concern with the geopolitical conditions  and 
transitions of the post-apartheid/post-settler city in Southern Africa.   Enduring racially aligned 
inequality and unhealed wounds of apartheid drive contemporary struggles for socio-spatial 
justice, politics and urban identities in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.  Socio-economic 
dualism (Potts, 2008) including dual land tenure systems in which rural land remains a form of 
insurance for the urban population mean that settler structures continues to be a relevant 
departure point for urban scholarship.  
 
Significant cumulative socio-economic and political factors beyond majority rule have conspired 
to shape the nature of urban transitions as is abundantly clear in the resurgent  literature on urban 
informality (Kamete, 2012, 2013a, b; Potts, 1995, 2008; Njaya, 2014a, b; Rogerson, 2016).  This 
literature has addressed questions of evolution and determinants of the ‘informality’ concept  
and the efficacy of policy responses (Potts, 2008; Rogerson 2016). Questions on how to interpret 
informality in relation to governance (Njaya, 2014a), to planning and modernist ideas of the city 
(Kamete, 2013a, 2013b; Muchadenyika, 2015; Muchadenyika and Williams, 2017) as well as 
agency and struggles from below (Gillespie, 2016) remain.  While concern with impacts of top 
down neoliberal globalisation dominate (Potts, 1995; 2010; Mbiba and Huchzemeyer, 2002), 
interest on varieties of low end globalisation tied to immigrant livelihoods have become 
significant (Zack, 2015; Thompson and Grant, 2015).  Street trading emerges as a major focus in 
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these studies (Kamete, 2013a, b; Njaya, 2014a, b; Zack, 2015; Rogerson, 2016).  However, as 
emphasised in this paper, the burgeoning informality goes beyond street trading and pervades 
institutional and political economy practices of national and local governments (Muchadenyika 
and Williams, 2017; Mbiba 2017).  
 
To fully grasp the urban transitions in Zimbabwe, one has to also consider other factors such as 
urban impacts of HIV/AIDSs, the specific geopolitical adventures like participating in the DRC 
war, pariah status of the country in international relations ,indigenisation and the ‘Look East 
Policy’  (Chan and Patel, 2007) within the wider context of China’s presence in Africa as well 
new diaspora agency (McGregor and Primorac, 2010; Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012). And 
crucially, are the urban impacts of the unfinished business of jambanja the ‘Fast Track Land 
Reform Program’ (FTLRP) since the turn of the millennium (the definition and preference for 
the term jambanja is outlined later).  Equally important is the unrelenting economic and 
financial crisis and undying politics since 2000.    All these contemporary forces and the 
landscape of urban informality have a historical connection that this paper seeks to mark in 
addressing the question of what has become of the Sunshine City, Harare.   
 
In a nutshell, reference to wider socio-economic forces (Rakodi, 1995: ix) is required when 
seeking to understand transformations of capitalist cities of post-apartheid Southern Africa. In 
particular, how dynamics of capitalist markets determine context specific outcomes (Harvey, 
1985: 1).  In this case to interrogate how jambanja and other forces have changed Zimbabwe’s 
settler capitalism and what urban impacts this brings.  For Harare, the challenge for scholarship 
is to expose the links between these structural changes and the everyday processes of its urban 
sprawl, poverty and informality juxtaposed to obnoxious wealth. Thus informed by a critical 
political economy understanding centred on jambanja and combined with the everyday 
metaphor of zhingzhong, this paper seeks to explain the extent to which Harare has departed 
from Rakodi’s (1995) characterisation not only in terms of the physical outlook but also in the 
nature of the inherent contradictions of its political economy. 
 
Visitors to Zimbabwe are surprised when they witness that despite two decade of a debilitating 
socio-economic crisis, citizens remain largely peaceful, prayerful, hospitable and humorous.  
New languages, rumour (Fontein, 2009), humour and metaphors (Chiumbu and Musemwa, 
2012) are fashioned to make sense of each phase of the crisis and mock the offending 
institutions.  This paper adopts the ‘Zhingzhong city’ metaphor to describe Harare’s 
contemporary transitions and conditions of informality and to contrast them to those of the 
‘Sunshine City’ label.  To ‘speak of transitions’  (Harvey, 1985) as those in Harare ‘is to 
understand continuities in their historicity’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: xvii).  Hence the paper 
uses jambanja, zhingzhong and a geo-historical political economy approach as the conceptual 
triumvirate to deepen understanding of urban informality and Harare’s fundamental economic 
and institutional restructuring that were tentative in the 1990s. The origins and utility of these 
conceptual tools are briefly outlined next, starting with jambanja  and then zhingzhong.   
 
A critical note on jambanja 
It is important to give a note on use of the concept  jambanja in preference to FTLRP. Jambanja 
is conceptually richer and captures the change that has happened in Zimbabwe than is the case 
with the technical and apolitical ‘land reform’ terminology.   Jambanja fully captures the 
‘annihilation and reconstruction’ of a culture or way of life extending from settler colonialism; a 
violation not only of the ‘sanctity’ of property rights in a capitalist world but also of Whiteness 
and the supremacy of Whites in Africa. The trauma of this violation, rupture and loss is captured 
in personalised narratives such as African Tears (Buckle, 2001) in ‘White Africa’, in ‘When a 
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crocodile eats the sun’ Godwin (2006) and ‘Mugabe and the white African’ (Thompson et al. 
2010)1.   Jambanja means ‘impunity’ (handikendenge, ugondidini?), ‘turning the tables upside 
down, rejection of existing order, revolt’.   
 
Furthermore, meanings of jambanja are layered whereas ‘fast track’ is not.  Jambanja is about 
refusing to be disciplined or to conform as are/in the daily practices of informality in Harare 
(Kamete, 2012; 2013a, b) at the same time as it is about disciplining society as epitomised by 
Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina.  At all scales from the state to the personal, jambanja 
was and remains a process of annihilation of the rule of law, as well as the trashing and rejection 
of norms that guide global, community and personal relations.  Using the official government of 
Zimbabwe term FTLFP, ‘normalises’ and depoliticises’ this process and denudes it of the 
cultural dimensions leaving it as a technical and administrative phenomenon.  If it was such a 
technical and administrative process, Zimbabwe would not be in the quagmire that it finds itself 
in today.  The language of FTLRP is reassuring and gives certainty and normalcy.  Yet, in 
reality, Zimbabwe remains an uncertain terrain where life is fragile and contingent as is captured 
in jambanja.  Moreover, jambanja was not just an event in 1999-2000, but remains the central 
mode of state-craft and everyday life not only in the rural country side but everywhere including 
in urban and peri-urban areas, in institutions and households.  Zimbabwe will never be the same 
again; but what it will be beyond jambanja – nobody knows.  Thus, using the Harare case, the 
paper employs culturally grounded notions of jambanja and zhingzhong to revisit, enrich and 
expand the literature on urban informality and urban transitions in Africa.  
  
Beyond an ethnic metaphor: ‘Zhingzhong’ and the urban political economy 
With Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy and the increasing number of Chinese nationals in 
Zimbabwe  since 1999, zhingzhong emerged initially as a derogatory term to refer to  the 
Chinese language that locals found incomprehensive.  To locals, the language is a series of 
‘zhings’ and ‘zhongs’.  Thus firstly, zhingzhong refers to a Chinese person or Chinese looking 
person2.  The use of such derogatory terms to label others, abhorrent as it often is, is not unusual 
where different ethnic groups come into contact. For instance in South Africa and Botswana, 
locals  label Zimbabwean and other African immigrants as makwerekwere or babblers whose 
speaking is incomprehensible (Muzondidya, 2010).  But for this paper zhinzhong is also a 
metaphor with intellectual import as explained below.   
 
The post 1990s interactions of Zimbabwe and China have witnessed increased importation of 
Chinese consumer products: Zimbabwe–China trade and Chinese investment in Zimbabwe has 
grown phenomenally and exceeds that of its former colonial master, Britain. Bilateral trade 
worth only US$52.2 million in 1996 had risen to US$1.1 billion in 2012 (Chun, 2014: 14-15).  
Chun (2014) argues that unlike relations with most of Africa, the trade balance is in favour of 
Zimbabwe.  Relations have moved beyond construction projects (hospitals3 and sports stadia) 
that had characterised the period from the 1980s or military hardware and training that have 
featured since the 1970s.  Chinese language and cultural studies were introduced at University of 
Zimbabwe (in 2007) and Great Zimbabwe University while Air Zimbabwe flights to Beijing 
were introduced but suspended in 2010.   
 
                                                          
1
 PBS NewsHour, 2011. http://www.pbs.org/pov/mugabe/ben-freeth-on-newshour/ 
2 To Zimbabweans, Japanese, Koreans, Filipino, Vietnamese are all seen as zhingzhong. 
3  For example Chinhoyi Hospital (a major referral hospital in the city of Chinhoyi) and 
Mwenezi District Hospital in the remote south of the country.  
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However, Chinese consumer goods imported into Zimbabwe in the early years tended to be poor 
quality products; they did not last and poor people bought them because of the low prices and 
lack of alternatives (Fontein, 2009: 3).  Zhingzhong thus also emerged as a derogatory term  
disparaging cheap Chinese goods.  But it has become a metaphor for products or anything that is 
perceived as of inferior quality, that does not last and that is cheap.  This is in contrast to 
‘mukambo’, ‘mupedzanhamo’ (that which brings relief or an end to poverty) or ‘zitye’ that 
describe second hand goods especially clothing. Zhingzhong is an addition to the lexicon of 
street trading and metaphors in Zimbabwe.   Crucially,  zhingzhong is also about anything, not 
just goods,  perceived as inferior or second grade status; the inferior infrastructure, governance 
systems and ideas.  Thus this paper is not about wider debates on the efficacy of contemporary 
Africa-China economic, investment and political relations (e.g. Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2009; 
Carmody, 2011). Instead it exploits what was originally local imagination and identification of 
Chinese  as zhingzhong and extrapolates it as a useful framing of urban transitions characterised 
by expanding informality; where scholars and policy makers say ‘informality’, ordinary citizens 
in Harare say zhingzhong.  
 
While zhingzhong will be used as a surface metaphor to describe physical manifestations of 
urban processes in Harare especially the deterioration of infrastructure and the environment, 
Harvey’s (1985) characterisation of the urbanisation of capital, contradictions and crisis of 
capitalism (Harvey 2014) provide the deeper political economy analytical reflections needed to 
aid appreciation of the urban impacts of jambanja and zhingzhong within it. Despite socialist 
rhetoric and ‘talk left’ by ZANU (PF) when it suits (Bond and Manyanya, 2002), Zimbabwe is 
intrinsically a capitalist society. Hence the need to try and understand urban processes within the 
lense of capitalist dynamics in which cities or the built environment arise from the creation of the 
infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange, consumption of commodities, social 
reproduction of labour and means of discipline and control. Hence the primacy  ‘of a functioning 
capital market and a state willing to finance and guarantee long-term projects with respect to the 
creation of the built environment (Harvey, 1985: 7). 
 
As discussed later, ‘functioning markets’ and ‘guarantees’ depend on property rights and rule of 
law that jambanja restructured or destroyed. Thus if Zimbabwe’s jambanja and indigenisation of 
the economy have dismantled the settler economy, whether and in what way it has impacted on 
urban structures and processes needs explaining. What kind of urban development process has 
been unleashed and what city form and function prevails or can be expected in future?  Both 
jambanja and indigenisation are precarious works in progress and their long-term outcomes 
unclear.  Zhingzhong captures how ordinary people view the contemporary urban conditions in 
Zimbabwe that have emerged recently. With the broad conceptual and metaphorical tools 
outlined, the next section summarises  the conditions leading to an absence of zhingzhong  in the 
first post-independence decade.  
 
Continuity and Constrained Urban Development, 1980s – 1990s 
The spatial growth of Harare is correlated to the trends in the delivery of land and housing 
supply for the majority low income Black population that until 1980 had no urban tenure.  Public 
sector and employer tied accommodation were key means of housing delivery soon after 
independence.  Despite what government presented [Table 1] as massive housing delivery 
between 1982 and 2000 (GoZ, 2005: 11), this supply was paltry when compared to the 
increasing urban housing backlog. 
 
Goz (1986: 12) and GoZ/USAID (1994) stressed key constraints to housing development that 
included bottlenecks in land supply, finance and institutional setting for land development.  Until 
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the late 1980s government constructed and supplied complete housing units.  There was neither 
private sector housing finance nor a mortgage industry for low income housing.   Workers were 
poorly paid, had no savings and could not afford borrowing while building societies had no 
experience lending to the poor and were also discouraged from doing so by unfavourable interest 
rates.  Mortgage finance for the poor emerged with government and USAID partnership to 
support housing markets in the period to 1996.   However, at 1992, the total national mortgage 
supply was a meagre  5534 per year (GoZ/USAID, 1994: 22) against a minimum requirement of 
66 000 mortgages per year needed to eliminate the housing backlog by year 2000  
 
The other major constraints were the high standards of construction and delays in the land 
development process, permits and titles.   GoZ/USAID  (1994: 27-28) reported that in Harare at 
1992,  it took on average of no less than forty one months to process land from identification 
stage to plot allocation: well above the global average of  thirteen months.   There were also  
distortions in the organisation of builders and buyers.   Private sector low income housing 
developers were dominantly large builders whose expertise was in commercial property 
development; they were inefficient and had limited experience in low income housing provision.  
Small scale indigenous builders faced barriers to entry into the market until the late 1990s.  
Consequently, there was little competition in the market. 
   
Thus inadequate funds, lack of competition, over reliance on the public sector, limited and 
inefficient providers and slow land delivery processes resulted in houses that the poor could not 
afford. Key indicators of this impact are given in [Table 2].  Increasing urban population growth 
and declining supply of housing resulted in chronic overcrowding within the existing stock of 
housing. In 1992 the entire urban population of 1.454 million were housed in 361 000 units 
giving an occupancy rate of six people per unit or a floor area of 7.0m2 per person compared to 
the globally approved 18m2..   This overcrowding had negative implications for environmental 
health and risks for spreading communicable diseases especially TB (GoZ, 1986: 33) conditions 
that became fatal with HIV/AIDS post 1995. 
 
Thus until the mid-1990s, spatial growth of the city was highly formal and constrained by a 
combination of development constraints cited earlier and a rigorous enforcement regime.   As 
witnessed in the case of Churu Farm in 1993/1994 (Auret, 1994) and Murambatsvina (Potts, 
2006;  Mbiba, 2017) the state was too ready to “fight illegally with illegality” (Hlatshwayo, 
1994); squatter settlements and informal developments were brutally demolished while those 
inherited from colonial times such as Epworth were contained and upgraded to meet expected 
standards of service provision and infrastructure.  Kamete (2012) has competently theorised 
these state actions as ‘disciplinary’ and ‘pastoral’ manifestations of state sovereign power in 
handling informality in Southern Africa. With such policies and capacity to act, growth beyond 
the city boundaries was almost non-existent. 
 
Harare in the 1980/90s was therefore an undisputed ‘sunshine city’; zhingzhong as inferior 
landscapes, governance and livelihood practices was beyond imagination at the time.  Yet the 
Chinese were already there in Harare; invisible but present in their support to the military as 
mentioned before.   They also had a physical presence and footprint in the construction of public 
buildings such as students’ hostels at University of Zimbabwe, hospitals and significantly the 60 
000 seater national sports stadium completed in 1987 and located 8km to the west of the city 
centre. There was a hostile but ineffective response to its construction especially from workers 
and University of Zimbabwe students at the time. Locals were offended by the use of Chinese 
labourers when unemployment was acute in the city. With protests ineffective, locals resorted to 
rumour. The most virulent rumour related to how the Chinese had ‘potted’ all stray dogs. The 
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rumour warned owners to keep a vigilant eye on their dogs.  But after hosting the Sixth All 
Africa Games in 1995 and became a venue for major soccer matches including the Brazil-
Zimbabwe friendly in 2010, the public grew to value it as a national asset; national events, 
political rallies, weddings, religious crusades and music festivals are staged there. 
 
The Neoliberal Decade: ESAP, Indigenisation and Meltdown 
However, the settler economy and its urban manifestations that had remained intact started to 
unravel following the country’s 1991 adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP).  Bond and Manyanya (2002) give a comprehensive analysis of forces 
leading to ESAP, key features of the policy and its devastating impact on the economy, workers 
and households.  Calamitous decisions to pay unbudgeted Z$50,000 each to over fifty thousand 
war veterans on Friday 14th November 2007 and participation in the DRC war a year later at a 
cost of US$1 million a day brought the economy to its knees. As Dawson and Kelsall (2012) 
argue, the ruling elite’s pursuit of anti-developmental patrimonialism meant Zimbabwe’s 
economy was doomed.   The urban impacts of this economic collapse have been far reaching and 
are presented below,  . 
 
By 1996, the rising political discontent and policy unpredictability scared investors and led to 
capital flight. Increasingly, the economy had no surplus to invest neither in the built environment 
nor in social reproduction of labour.  But the ruling party invested more in the security services.  
Military officers and police returning from the DRC War and UN Special Peace Keeping 
Missions emerged as among those with large amounts of foreign currency which they invested 
heavily in real estate; buying up existing houses and plots particularly in Harare’s  infill 
developments such as Warren Park North, Tynwald and expansions in the Bulawayo and 
Chinhoyi Road corridors as well as upmarket suburbs of Mt. Pleasant, Mandara and Chisipite.   
 
As a result of ESAP’s debilitating impacts, the new poor (Minujin, 1995) especially teachers and 
health professionals joined an emigration exodus initially to neighbouring and OECD countries 
from where they sent remittances that were partly invested in property (Mbiba, 2005).  Infill 
developments such as Vainona/Mt Pleasant and Borrowdale West were typical developments 
dominated by remittance investments from health workers in the early part of the migration 
phase. The development was nicknamed ‘machembere’  a derogatory name implying that 
remittances were earned from ‘dirty’ work caring for old people (machembere) in the UK.   Thus 
solutions to the problem of development finance at state and institutional level were emerging in 
new actors at household level from the late 1990s.  Although they had local authority planning 
approvals, most of the infill developments encroached on or took up what had previously been 
deemed sacrosanct city wetlands. 
 
In the neoliberal context, government also encouraged local authorities to promote participation 
of Black people in small enterprises and formal sectors of the economy where they had been 
previously prohibited.  Statutory Instrument (SI) 216 of 1994 for example required local 
authorities to relax urban by-laws and allow home industries and trading where this had been 
prohibited before.   This set in the informalization of the urban space-economy.   Meanwhile, the 
agitation of indigenous lobby groups (e.g. Indigenous Business Development Centre and 
Affirmative Action Group) witnessed “champions” such as Roger Boka who was not only one of 
the first to buy a city centre block of offices (Boka Islip House along Samora Machel Avenue) 
[See Figure, 1]  but in 1996 went on to set up the Boka Tobacco Auctions Floors on over 12 
hectares of land along Simon Marodze Road to the south of the city. These are now the leading 
trading space for tobacco.  However his United Merchant Bank collapsed on the back of 
irregular trading and bad debts (loans given mainly to ZANU (PF) politicians and businesses) 
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(Dawson and Kelsall, 2012).   The drivers of the demise of Boka’s bank were precursors of 
worse things to come post 2000 when several banks were liquidated and Zimbabwe became a 
‘casino economy’ (Gono, 2008). 
 
The liberalised political economy and ‘indigenisation’ policy4 was used as a cover for the 
emergence of dealer developers who used insider information within local authorities to 
manipulate the planning and land development system leading to developments that would not 
have been permissible before.  These irregular or opaque developments include Sam Levy 
Village in Borrowdale (see City of Harare, 2005/2006), paradoxically now the most prestigious 
out of town shopping centre [see Figure 2]. The Thompson Report (GoZ, 1999)  provides details 
of irregular practices across the city during this period;  notably those by Harare City Mayor 
Solomon Tawengwa in Highfield and at Corner Samora Machel Avenue and Enterprise Road on 
the eastern edge of the CBD.  These contentious and irregular developments like Sam Levy 
Village were subsequently ‘regularized’ by the planning authorities.   However, they became a 
template for rampant elite and local authority-led irregular developments during the economic 
crisis a decade later (see City of Harare 2010). These developments including the most recent 
Chinese Longcheng Plaza Mall (to be presented later) are world class in physical terms but 
‘zhingzhong’ in the way they shredded, abused and cheapened land use and planning systems.    
 
Traditional institutional investors such as Old Mutual, the Mining Industry Pension Fund and the 
recently established National Social Security Authority also invested in commercial city centre 
offices of an urban regeneration nature (e.g. Eastgate Shopping Mall and offices), out of town 
shopping malls, high and middle income residential developments.   Arundel Shopping Centre, 
Mt. Pleasant Shopping Centre to the north of the city, and city centre buildings like NSSA, 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Joina Centre and Corner House were products of this era that were 
either urban regeneration or infill development in nature.  ZIMRE Park to the north east was an 
example of expansion development as was OMPIC’s (1995) Bluff Hill Westgate Development 
on a 550 ha peri-urban farm.    
 
In terms of the zhingzhong metaphor, there were neither physical Chinese related developments 
nor a Chinese presence of significance during this ESAP era.   But relaxation of by-laws in the 
context of the SI 216 as well as dealer developments saw a creeping polarisation and dilution of 
the quality of both governance and the physical environment including in the city centre.   
Harare City Council allowed ‘Flea Markets’ where traders could sell any merchandise; mostly 
imported clothing, kitchenware and other consumer items.  Coupled with increased importation 
of second hand cars, thanks to trade de-regulation, Harare city centre became congested and 
unclean.  Readily available imported second hand minibuses replaced old Peugeot 404 vehicles 
and government public transport in the form of ZUPCO buses.  With increasing bureaucratic 
poverty and militarisation of the economy, the control and operation of these new forms of 
public transport have become a terrain of systemic police corruption including soliciting of 
bribes at ubiquitous road blocks that any traveller will encounter in Zimbabwe5.   Institutional 
abuse rather than proper enforcement of rules prevails; hence another dimension of zhingzhong 
emerged.   The minibuses enabled commuting to peripheral areas that had been unreachable by 
ZUPCO buses. This created conditions for rapid urban sprawl into areas lacking water, sewer, 
roads and electricity infrastructure.  The impact of these myriad factors are such that Harare’s 
                                                          
4 Subsequently consolidated as “Indigenisation and Economic empowerment Act [Chapter 14: 
33] 2007,  Government of Zimbabwe. 
5
  See “Chihuri admits cops are corrupt”  The Herald, Monday 10th April 2017, On-line: 
http://www.herald.co.zw/chihuri-admits-cops-are-corrupt/ [last visited 20th April 2017] 
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structure, institutions and land use patterns gradually became  considerably different from those 
of its settler colonial past. 
 
Plunge and Jambanja: First Decade of the Millennium and Beyond 
The plunge has two meanings in this paper.  First, in line with Bond and Manyanya (2002) it 
refers to the point when the economy  and  subsequent political and social conditions plummeted 
rapidly from 1997/98 reaching peak crisis in 2008/2009 (Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012).  
Second it refers to jambanja, as the decisive actions to proceed and dispossess thousands of 
white farmers and handing over the land to thousands of peasants and those pledging support to 
ZANU (PF) the ruling party. Following years of prevarication, this bold move was cataclysmic 
in the short term.  This section signposts the nature of economic collapse, its socio-economic 
dimensions and spatial manifestations and how jambanja as an ongoing process is implicated in 
the expansion and intensification of informality. 
 
Jambanja effects from 2000, cemented and accelerated an economic meltdown of the neoliberal 
era.  Although the ESAP of the 1990s, 1997 Black Friday  and participation in the DRC war 
(1998) had significant economic impacts they were not as foundational as jambanja.  Jambanja 
was foundational in that it destroyed the market value of rural agricultural land that acted as the 
collateral basis upon which long term development lending was based.   Without the individual 
property rights to rural land and rule of law, capital has no security and there is no capitalism as 
experienced since 1890; no bank lending to rural agriculture, no production, processing, trading, 
exporting and all the related employment.  Post jambanja bank lending has been mainly short 
term (30 days or ninety days).  This only enables short term investment which is of a buying and 
selling nature.  Hence the economy shifted from job creating production and manufacturing to 
importing and selling of consumer products making Zimbabwe an economy of traders ever 
since.  The liquidity crisis that set in is exacerbated by ‘pillow banking’, externalisation or cash 
simply not being released into an economy where the traditional collateral security is non-
existent.   
 
Government’s responses to the liquidity crisis have only shifted and expanded the crisis. Printing 
of money by the RBZ accelerated hyperinflation leading to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar.  
Equally, Gono’s (2008) description of how the economy became a casino economy is correct as 
a description of irregular practices by banks, businesses and ordinary people seeking to amass 
wealth in an insecure environment.  A shift from formality to informality and collapse of 
industry has characterised the economy.   Rakodi (1995: 110) reported that Harare had firms that 
employed 317 267 workers. However, fifteen years later in 2010, the total number of employees 
had dropped to 260 100 (ZimStat, 2013:11) against a total population that had almost doubled.  
Crucially, in 1990, manufacturing in Harare employed about 93 518 workers making about 30% 
of the total workforce in the province.  But by 2012, manufacturing jobs had dropped to 41 881 
(ZimStat, 2012: 75) and making a paltry 5.6% of all employees in the Harare Province.   In place 
of manufacturing, the city economy is now dominated by services, trading, the informal sector, 
self-employment and imported consumer goods.  
 
The collapse of the formal economy and growth of informality has meant an ever shrinking 
revenue base for both national and local governments.  Avoidance of taxes is now a key feature 
of both formal and informal businesses.  Consequently, the financial and liquidity crisis at City 
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of Harare that had set in by 1996 (GoZ, 1999) has become endemic6.  Thus Harare has become a 
‘zhingzhong city’ in terms of its economy, its governance, quality of infrastructure and services 
[Figure 3 ].  For instance, census figures (ZimStat, 2012: 127 and 132-133) portray a positive 
service provision situation where 75.8% of the population has electricity, 78.9 % have water on 
their premises and 85% have flush toilets.  But these figures are nominal and mask a desperate 
situation where water rarely comes out of the taps and when it does,  is dirty and not suitable for 
human consumption. With rapid urban sprawl in the last fifteen years, the new peri-urban 
residential areas lack water, electricity supply, waterborne sanitation and solid waste removal 
services.  Combined with the decayed infrastructure7 in the older parts of the city, the spectre of 
ill-health and diseases such as cholera hangs over the city (UN-HABITAT, 2010: 210 - 211). 
 
Jambanja and its impacts coincided with other significant demographic changes in the country. 
The collapse of health services, water and other infrastructure at the beginning of the new 
millennium coincided with the exponential growth in HIV/AIDS related deaths with devastating 
impacts on labour, service delivery, family cohesion and cities.  Urban cemeteries filled up and 
kuMbudzi, the cemetery next to Boka Tobacco Auction Floors had taken 14 000 burials in seven 
years from when it was opened in 1997 (Mbiba, 2010: 154-155).  This devastation had not been 
expected.   
  
The socio-economic collapse that ensued following jambanja is legendary; collapse of industry, 
the currency, livelihoods and infrastructure. The exodus to  neighbouring countries, Europe and 
beyond accelerated ushering in a new phenomenon – diaspora.  Financial, food and material 
remittances from the diaspora emerged not only as the largest humanitarian contribution but also 
a source of further investment in real estate.  The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe set up a facility 
‘Home Link (Pvt) Ltd’ incorporated in 2004, with a view to exploit the remittances market 
particularly in residential developments8.  However, the mistrust between the diaspora and 
ZANU (PF) government led to furtive operations of this project since inception (Fingaz, 2004; 
New Zimbabwe, 2004; Mbiba, 2005) with most recent initiatives to reinvigorate it up-scaled in 
2014.   
 
With collapse of formal sector jobs, rapid informalisation ensued including in the city centre.  As 
a strategy to retain control of the economy and contain a restive population, the ZANU (PF) 
government creates ‘turbulence’ to generate uncertainly and to disturb the emergence of any 
cohesive mass upheaval.   The massive nationwide Operation Murambatsina/Restore Order 2005 
(GoZ, 2005; Potts, 2006) has to be seen in this light.  It destroyed almost all informal trading, 
house extensions and livelihoods; driving many further into poverty (Banana et al. 2016) or into 
the diaspora while creating a sense of uncertainty and fear among those that remained.  
 
But key to underline are the other urban land use impacts of jambanja on Harare’s urban land 
use alluded to in a number of papers (Marongwe, 2003; Kamete, 2012; Banana et al. 2016).  The 
destruction of rural large scale farms displaced former farm workers, thousands of whom sought 
livelihoods in the urban and peri-urban areas of Harare.  Secondly, ZANU (PF) (plus other land 
                                                          
6 See “Harare City Council owed US$280 million”  Zimbabwe Situation, 14th September 2014. 
Online: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_w_radiovop-zimbabwe-harare-city-
council-owed-280m/ [last visited 11th April 2017] 
7  The City loses 60% by value of treated water due to leakages in the dilapidated pipe system, 
see page 10, City of Harare, State of the City Address by the Mayor, Cllr Bernard G. 
Manyenyeni, 1st March 2016, Harare.  
8 See http://homelinkzim.com/ (last visited 18th April 2017). 
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barons and a range of actors) illegally made peri-urban land available to its supporters or anyone 
who could promise support to the party (Muchadenyika, 2015; Muchadenyika and Williams, 
2017; Mbiba, 2017).  Urban and peri-urban land became a resource for political patronage and 
survival.    The systems of land allocation and delivery diligently protected and maintained in 
previous decades were now suspended, abandoned and despised.  The outcome of this was not 
just rapid urban infill (Mbiba, 2000; Kamusoko et al. 2013) and spatial urban expansion beyond 
previous boundaries (Mbiba, 2017) but also a disdain for urban planning controls 
(Muchadenyika and Williams, 2017).   This disdain for planning is palpable among both political 
elites and institutions who seek to grab land and among the poor seeking plots for housing or 
trading space (Kamete, 2013,a, b). Thus the urban outcomes of jambanja bring us back to 
zhingzhong; informality, chaotic and poor quality urban environments. 
 
Harare has emerged as a zhingzhong city in the sense that goods sold in both formal and 
informal spaces of Harare are now of Chinese origin (Figure 4).   Whole zones from edges of 
Magaba, Charter Road and Kopje in the south west of the city to Samora Machel in the north 
and on either side of Robert Mugabe all the way to Fourth Street Road Port (to the east), the city 
has become informal with trading on the streets (see also Njaya, 2014a, b; Rogerson, 2016).  
New enclaves of money making have emerged where young entrepreneurs take advantage of the 
collapse of the city governance and corrupting it as they go along.  A significant chunk of the 
money earned in these ‘informal enclaves’ is ‘exported’ to enclave residential developments 
beyond Borrowdale to the north east of the city9.  
 
Relative to the 1980s and 1990s, Harare city of today is chaotic, noisier and dirty with improper 
disposal of waste and irregular developments on wetlands as confirmed recently in parliament by 
the Hon. Minister of Environment, Water and Climate recently (Zimbabwe Hansard, 2017).  In 
land use and development terms, there is another dimension in that Chinese investors, 
purportedly working in alliance with military officers10 are among those that have grabbed, 
privatised and developed pieces of open spaces reserved for public uses or wetlands.  The most 
visible and ‘notorious’ case cited by key informants is the Longcheng Plaza, Belvedere, opened 
to the public in December 2013 (The Sunday Mail, 2013: ; Zimbabwe Hansard, 2017).  
Considered together with the National Sports Stadium, a belt of land bounded by Princes Road 
(to the north), Bulawayo Road (to the south), Golden Quarry Road (to the west) and Mutley 
Bend Road (to the east) can now be considered a ‘zhingzhong zone’ (Figure 5).  Further planned 
developments by the Chinese investors in this zone include a hotel. Consequently, new 
‘zhingzhong’ land uses and Chinese architecture are now an emerging feature of urban Harare as 
are the ‘zhingzhong’ goods, quality of infrastructure and governance.  
 
Indeed the Chinese are not the only culprits developing on Harare’s wetlands or engaged in land 
grabbing or illegal land development as evidenced in the commission of inquiry reports (GoZ, 
1999) and for Chitungwiza and Caledonia (see Mbiba, 2017: 10-11). The millennium shopping 
centre project in Borrowdale, billed to be the largest investment in recent years, has to be 
included in this bracket.  However, in contrast to the other offenders key informants in the 
bureaucracy, were of the view that the Chinese developers make little effort to engage and 
regularise as was the case for example with Sam Levy.  Furthermore, Longcheng Plaza is in a 
location more visible to the majority of the poor - hence it gets mentioned more often than the 
others in prime low density high income residential areas.  Beyond the Chinese, and aided by the 
                                                          
9  Business Key Informant, Harare, 7th August 2014 
10   Key informant interview, 7th August 2014 
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patronage system around land allocation that has emerged since 2000, residents, businesses have 
erected houses and developments without land-use planning approval thus destroying the 
planning system (Kamete, 2012; 2013a, b;  Muchadenyika and Williams, 2017) pivotal in 
maintaining the image of Harare as a Sunshine City till the 1990s.  
 
The cumulative spatial effects of the neoliberal reforms, jambanja and demographic changes are 
witnessed in rapid sprawl of the city and growth in built development.   Analysis of satellite 
images (Kamusoko et al. 2013) show that through infill, expansion and leapfrog developments it 
took only fifteen years from 1999, for the built up growth to cover a land area similar to that 
which had taken over 115 years since 1890.  The western and southward expansion in built 
development especially on either side of the Harare to Masvingo Highway is in line with 
proposals of the 1991 Harare Combination Master Plan (HCMP).  However, that plan did not 
anticipate that growth would be rapid and in other directions such as north east into Goromonzi-
Ruwa and  Arcturus (Mbiba, 2017), or to the north into Mazowe District and worse still into 
Lake Chivero’s basin to the west of the city.   Before jambanja, the HCMP had argued that 
infrastructure constraints and the need to protect prime commercial agricultural land would limit 
growth into these areas.  But with jambanja the large scale commercial farms have disappeared 
and are largely state land administered by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement.  On 
request from the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing , some of 
this land can be released for urban development. Recent peri-urban developments have 
proceeded without incorporation of the land into urban areas as per legal requirements (Mbiba, 
2017).  The prohibitive cost of land for urban expansion has also disappeared.   Growth has 
proceeded informally, patchily with no supporting infrastructure and services creating a 
zhingzhong landscape.    
 
Conclusions: Harare – continuity and change 
This paper contributes case study material to the understanding of unfolding world transitions 
especially the rapid urban transformations in Africa dominant in contemporary research (Gough 
and Willis, 2016) and policy debates on transformative urbanisation (UN-HABITAT, 2008; 
2010; OECD/AfDB, 2016).  For a first-time visitor to Harare, Rakodi’s (1995) diagnosis of 
Harare as a European city in Africa and one that works - a sunshine city - appears still relevant 
especially if viewed from the comforts of many of the city’s hotels or the top floor of one of the 
sprouting skyscrapers; continuities abound.  However, beyond the hotel comforts, for residents 
of the city and those monitoring its welfare over the years, the label of a ‘sunshine city’ has been 
replaced by one of ‘zhingzhong’.  The paper has used zhingzhong not just as a reference to 
highlight the upsurge in Chinese presence and Chinese products marketed on the streets but 
importantly as a metaphor (Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012) for low quality and decay in the 
infrastructure, services to corruption of institutions especially planning and local government 
(Kamete, 2012, 2013a, b; Mbiba, 2017; Muchadenyika and Williams, 2017) and to governance 
and general urban economic decay of the city.  Zhingzhong is one of many metaphors 
Zimbabweans have invented to give meaning to and make sense of the crises they have 
experienced since the 1990s era of ESAP (Zimbabweans caricatured it as a policy designed for 
the Extended Suffering of African People).   
 
In its call to interrogate post –settler capitalist colonial cities such as Harare in this paper 
suggests that we employ Harvey’s (1985) understanding of a capitalist city in which the city is a 
socio-spatial manifestation of processes of capital accumulation, expansion and mobility.  
Anchoring these processes are the systems of individual property rights and rural land values 
that previously acted as collateral for bank credit and lending that underpinned the settler 
colonial economy.  For Zimbabwe, neoliberal reforms of the 1990s reinforced the operation and 
12 
 
sanctity of these systems.  Similarly, while crises like the Black Friday of 1997, participation in 
the DRC war in 1998 and HIV/Aids had significant economic and finance impacts, they were 
not a direct attack on these capitalist foundations. Jambanja changed this. But while in jambanja 
the ruling elites abolished rural property rights, they have been both shrewd and ‘cynical’ in their 
maintenance of urban property rights . In Harvey’s (1985; 2003) terms, this enables urban land 
to be an accumulation  sphere and investment destination of surpluses earned  or robbed 
elsewhere including in the rural sphere. 
 
The paper’s narrative suggests research is needed to understand how in each epoch since the 
1980s, finance has shifted from one sector to another, into and out of the built environment. It 
exposed the different actors involved, and how the role and nature of the state and the 
framework of rules deployed have all changed.  The policy attempts to indigenise the economy 
within the context of ESAP created opportunities for accumulation and the emergence of a new 
vigilante capitalist class but little investment went into production, infrastructure and services.  
The state’s capacity to deliver was also eroded by ESAP.   During the phases to ESAP, 
zhingzhong existed in the form of Chinese investments in public infrastructure and buildings and 
support to the military whose history can be traced to the 1970s. But the city remained ‘the 
sunshine city’ until jambanja. 
 
Jambanja was the foundational or structural change that created conditions for a ‘global’ crisis 
and expansion of zhingzhong.   Jambanja abolished individual property rights in the rural 
agricultural land.   For an agro-industry based economy, this removed the collateral basis for 
lending in the economy.   The emerging political crisis from 2000 became a ‘global’ crisis 
(Harvey, 1985: 13) in that it affected all sectors, all spheres of life, all regions of the country, 
neighbouring states, geopolitical and international relations with former colonial powers in 
Europe. Moreover, without investment in production, the collapse of industry, employment and 
incomes led to a collapse of the revenue base and lines of credit.  Consequently, the liquidity 
crisis of City of Harare since mid-1990s, like that of the country has become intractable.  The 
city transformed from a manufacturing city to a ‘city of traders’ in imported consumer goods.  
The rules and planning laws that regulated urban and peri-urban space for capitalist markets to 
thrive have been abandoned or abused (Mbiba, 2017; Muchadenyika and Williams, 2017).  
Chinese investment and actors have become bigger players while western capital ‘ran for cover’ 
relocating to other countries11.   
 
For citizens, zhingzhong describes and gives meaning to a city whose infrastructure has 
collapsed, the management unable to intervene meaningfully and survival is through irregular 
predatory means or ‘by the Grace of God’.  Zhingzhong also captures the societal attitudes, 
practices and institutional norms that now characterise everyday life in the city.  Resort to open 
defiance, endemic informality and public spirituality have become some of the obvious major 
phenomena.  Chinese products on the streets compete with Christian music CDs and related 
paraphernalia while mega Christian Church buildings compete for skyline prominence against 
the office blocks and Chinese malls.  However, if the Chinese and irregular origins of malls such 
as Longcheng Plaza are put to the side, what remains are not only spaces of capitalist expansion 
but also continuing contradictions (Harvey, 2014) with juxtaposition of acute poverty and 
‘stinking’ wealth.  However, this juxtaposition of environmental decay and acute poverty in 
                                                          
11  See “No EU funding for ZIMASSET” page 2, The Zimbabwe Independent, Harare , 1st – 7th 
August 2014;  “US$2bn Chinese bailout: Mugabe to Visit China for package this month” 
pages 1 -2 The Zimbabwe Independent, Harare , 1st – 7th August 2014. 
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large parts of the city with obnoxious affluence is not unique to Harare but is typical of the 
inequalities prevailing in  capitalist societies of Southern Africa.   
 
Rakodi’s (1995) narrative pointed to Harare enduring as a settler colonial city devoid of slums 
(Potts, 2006). The  physical, governance and ideational legacy of the settler period was 
remarkably strong and persistent, partly because the built environments were inherently long 
lasting, but not least because keeping white capital happy served the purposes of the government 
at that time.  This paper has illustrated how the strains from the inherent contradictions 
manifested themselves recently in jambanja.  It argued for jambanja to been seen beyond the 
narrow ‘time bound’ land restricted definition to a multi-layered conception that embodies 
foundational change and enduring state impunity that has now spread to all avenues of society; 
contemporary urban informality thrives in and is an inevitable outcome of jambanja.  It is  
jambanja impunity that has led to the breakdown and destruction of the capitalist relations, good 
governance, vibrant industrial sector, well managed physical environments, infrastructure and an 
ideational legacy that qualified Harare as a sunshine city to one whose identity is best captured 
by ordinary people’s metaphor of a ‘zhingzhong city’.   
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